INTRODUCTION
"Convergence" between the capital markets and reinsurance markets is not the hot topic it once was. However, "convergence" has led to this: the prime mover of insurance risk via securitizations is an investment bank (Goldman Sachs) rather than an intermediary; and, one of the most active leveraged underwriters of capital market credit risk is a reinsurer (Swiss Re) rather than a hedge fund or bank. Both phenomena provide testimony to the institutional consequences of "convergence" but other effects, particularly product design, are also continuing apace.
One such product is the Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) -subspecies of which are Collateralized Bond Obligations (CBOs) and Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs).
CDOs combine in their structure elements of bond portfolio management (typical of capital markets) with hierarchy of claims or priority of loss payments (typical of insurance structures). CDOs are not brand new, but as the accompanying chart makes clear, they have grown dramatically since 1995 (See Figure 1 ). Early buyers of CDOs were typically high-yield bond portfolio managers.
More recently, reinsurers have come to appreciate the "insurance nature" of these CDO structures -so much so that multiline reinsurers have begun to support CDOs via financial guarantees. By way of example, in June 1999 and in August 2000 Centre Re sponsored its own design of a new CBO and CLO respectively. (See press announcements on the Centre Group's website: www.CentreRe.com.)
Beyond the involvement of insurers in CDOs is the unappreciated fact that CDOs themselves are selfcontained insurance structures. The pricing and design of CDO tranches are, therefore, subject to actuarial analysis. The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the nature of this self-contained structure and to raise questions about whether insurance industry involvement can further change (improve?) CDO product design. Our attention is confined to "Cash-Flow CDOs," and as is our usual practice, we begin the discussion by laying out the basics.
PERSPECTIVES ON THE BASIC CASH-FLOW CDO STRUCTURE
Bond buyers may be viewed as primary insurers against corporate default.
Contained in the interest rate, or coupon, received by a bondholder are at least two component payments. The first compensates the bondholder for the time-vale of money lent to the corporation as if repayment were guaranteed, as it would be, for example, by the US Treasury. This is the socalled risk-free rate. The second component of the coupon may be viewed as the reward for taking the risk that the corporate borrower may not live up to its promise for full repayment of its corporate obligation. This may be viewed as a premium for insuring against the risk of default.
By way of example, if a one-year bond yields 7.75% and one-year treasury obligations yield 6%, the risk-free rate is 6% and the default premium is 1.75%.
(This assumes that other identifiable components -such as, optionality, or call featuresare non-existent or are stripped out.)
In the one-year case, a bond buyer's 1.75% coupon premium would be viewed by a reinsurer as a 1.75% Rate-on-Line. That is: premium divided by maximum loss, where maximum loss is failure to repay any principal at the end of the bond's life. (Iridium springs to mind.) In the multiyear case, 1.75% is the annual premium received during each year that the bond has not defaulted. For the reinsurer, the 1.75% would be characterized as the annual Rate-on-Line received on a multiyear policy containing a single aggregate occurrence limit. The limit would equal principal.
RISK CONTROL
Now, few bond buyers and probably even fewer reinsurers would expose all of their capital to the risk of default by a single entity, corporate or otherwise.
Prudence, and science, suggests limiting total losses by allocating capital to a number of, ideally uncorrelated, individual exposures. Risk-limitation is achieved with a diversified portfolio for bond buyers and reinsurers alike.
Risk can be further controlled by the selection of the quality of the bonds that enter the portfolio itself.
Whether diversified or not, whether highly selective or not, the resulting bond portfolio is nevertheless insuring against the probability of default. Diversification and selectivity of bonds merely shapes the return and risk from such coverage. New products suggest further ways to mold the portfolio risk profile.
In particular, CDOs provide a third way of shaping risk and return. Essentially, the portfolio manager removes risk from his portfolio by buying insurance from another portfolio manager who is prepared to take the risk of a large number of losses. This is analogous to a primary insurer minimizing large loss experience by buying excessof-loss insurance from a reinsurer. The parallels between a CDO and a reinsurance structure are best illustrated by a specific example.
A CDO ILLUSTRATION
Consider Table 1 . It shows a typical CDO structure with three capital tranches. The table shows that $305 million has been raised from the issuance of senior, mezzanine and junior floating rate note tranches. Placement fees have consumed $5 million (1.64% or 14 bps per year) and the remaining $300 million has been invested in collateral assets (fixedrate high-yield bonds) with an average quality of BBB -(i.e., minimal investment grade).
The portfolio of assembled bonds has an average coupon rate of 10.19%. At the time of portfolio assembly the risk-free rate was 6% and the swap rate (the premium to switch from fixed to floating rates) was 120 bps. In total 7.2% of the coupon covered the time value of floating-rate money. The remaining 299 bps of coupon therefore represents the annual premium allocated to cover default risk. On a portfolio of $300 million, this represents an amount of $8.97 million per year ($108 million total for bonds of 12-year maturity). Now assume that the portfolio assembler has only $45 million in capital for which he requires an equity-like return. He could borrow $260 million (assume for the moment that such a lender exists) and purchase the $300 million collateral. His rate of return will be his 10.19% coupon (on the whole portfolio), less borrowing cost, less default experience divided by total financing. If he selects bonds well, his returns will be high. If he selects poorly (or has bad economic experience), his returns will be low.
If default experience is very bad, he could lose all of his capital, plus some. In this case, his lender would seize the remaining bonds, sell them, and come after the borrower for any shortfall -an unhappy circumstance.
Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) was only the most recent in a long line of portfolio managers who have tried this leveraged strategy or one of its time-honored variants. Unfortunately, LTCM met said "unhappy circumstance" losing all of their own capital and only avoided losing lenders' money because of the actions of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The Fed justified its actions by citing the "systemic risk" (compound losses) to the banking system.
CDOs take a different route to funding in at least two important respects.
First, the portfolio purchased is fully funded by non-recourse debt. Second, the hierarchy or priority of claims is carefully recognized and precisely compensated.
Returning to our portfolio manager with only $45 million in capital, he effectively says to the mezzanine bond buyer, "Will you take the default risk after my $45 million capital is exhausted? In exchange, after I have assembled the $300 million portfolio, I will pay you part of the $8.97 million annual default premium." In the illustration, he pays the $2.37 to the mezzanine buyer. The mezzanine bond buyer acts exactly like a reinsurer, writing an excess-of-loss policy after the first $45 million of default losses.
In the example, the mezzanine reinsurer takes only $25 million of risk himself and retrocedes to another the remainder ($235 million) by sharing his part of his risk premium with a third party. Now, the chance of enough defaults wiping out both the primary insurer and the reinsurer is very, very low. Therefore, the premium is correspondingly small (in this example $1.29 million -the equivalent of 55 bps on $235 million).
In effect, the CDO structure parses and rewards the risk according to where each investor is in the loss hierarchy. The primary layer (Junior Tranche) obtains a Rate-on-Line of 13.88%, the reinsurer (Mezzanine Tranche) a Rate-on-Line of 4.30%, and the retrocessionaire (Senior Debt) obtains 55 bps. When combined with the time value of money and the swap cost, the junior debt receives a coupon of LIBOR + 1388 bps, the mezzanine debt receives LIBOR + 430 bps, and the senior debt LIBOR + 55 bps.
The nature of the premium flow is shown in Figure 2 . The diagram provides the view of a CDO through the lens of a capital market buyer and a reinsurance underwriter. In practice, of course, the CDO does not get arranged this way. The CDO arranger, usually an investment bank, observes the prices available on rated corporate debt and investigates whether it can be parsed in such a way as to satisfy the market demands of junior, mezzanine, and senior debt buyers. He is aided in this examination by rating agencies that test the risk of each tranche and assign an appropriate rating. An arranger will initiate a CDO if the returns available on the asset side are greater than the costs of the liability side. A CDO so initiated is called an "Arbitrage CDO." There are also "Balance Sheet CDOs" which start with a given asset portfolio and cede away senior claims if it is either (a) economically worthwhile, or (b) regulatorially worthwhile. In either case, the CDO transforms a portfolio of assets with one quality profile into liabilities with the same average quality.
ALCHEMY
In a sense, alchemy has been performed. It is best illustrated in a diagram. (See Figure 3 .)
The amount and average quality of the bonds shown on the right (the collateral) is identical to the amount and average quality of the bonds shown on the left (the capital structure). The only difference between the left and right (between the capital structure and collateral) is the priority of claims or the hierarchy of loss obligations. A default of a single bond has an effect on the average performance of all of the collateral assets.
However, on the liability side, the single default will only affect the junior tranche. The collateral portfolio shares losses on a "Quota-share" basis while the capital structure shares losses on an "Excess-of-Loss" basis. It is worth spending a moment more on this point. "How," one might ask, "can high-yield bonds be created out of a collateral portfolio that is above investment grade?" as is the average quality in our illustration.
The answer is hierarchy. All investment grade bonds have an annual probability of default no greater than say 0.25%. This means that "on average" in portfolios with 400 independent bonds, only one will default each year (i.e., a $0.25 loss per $100 fully invested). Spread across the portfolio, this is a break-even cost of 2.5 bps expected loss on each bond. However, the breakeven cost of protection for assuming the risk of the first loss is much higher. Even for a portfolio of 400 all investment-grade bonds, there is only a 37% chance of no default losses --by implication, a 63% chance of one or more losses. Protecting the first loss would be expensive, a premium of 63 bps on that bond (i.e., $0.1575 versus $0.0025 on each bond).
Hopefully, the point is made. Creative structuring can create high-yield risk out of investment grade collateral. Conversely, of course, investment grade risk can also be created out of high-yield collateral. Alchemy indeed.
FEES
Then there is the question of fees. In our illustration, a one-time payment of $5 million of placement fees is taken out of funds raised. Are CDOs expensive structures compared to other ways in which an insurer might generate premium? The premium flowing through the structure is $8.97 million per year. In insurance, the acquisition of premium usually involves payment of brokerage and often a ceding commission. In simple industry-loss reinsurance transactions, the brokerage is often about 5%, sometimes as much as 10%, of the premium (i.e., on a premium of $8.97 million, the brokerage would be $0.45 million per year, or $5.4 million over 12 years).
In the CDO structure, the comparable cost is the initial placement fee plus an ongoing administrative fee. Initial fees, which represent the difference between money raised and money invested, are usually in the order of 1% to 2% of money raised. The average may be 1.5%, and in our example, 1.64%. Administration fees may be 5 bps a year. As Table 2 shows, this amounts to $6.8 million.
Compared directly to reinsurance brokerage, the cost appears to be quite similar.
If the initial portfolio is fixed and passive (as may be the case with synthetic CLOs or Balance Sheet CBOs), no other management fees are liable. For actively managed portfolios, a further annual 40 to 60 bps may be in order.
These would be comparable to ceding commissions on the underlying business management.
In short, CDO fees, when viewed from the perspective of other means by which insurers can gain premium, seem competitively priced. That general statement, however, should not hide the fact that excessive or hidden fees in CDOs can materially affect their attractiveness.
COVENANTS
Treaty reinsurers typically assume risk from primary insurers only after they are convinced that the primary is a profitable and responsible underwriter. Once committed to a treaty, the fate of the reinsurers is in the hands of the primaryunless there has been a violation of underwriting guidelines, in which case disputes can arise. The purpose of underwriting guidelines is, therefore, to circumscribe the primary's actions to those that are known and agreed upon. Without such restrictions and an alignment of interest, the reinsurer is at the mercy of the future (potentially capricious) actions of the underwriter, as well as the inherent risk of the product line itself.
So it is with reinsurers who provide financial guarantees to tranches of "managed" CDOs. CDOs whose assets are to be "managed" must be evaluated on the abilities of the manager to select assets, as well as the inherent risks that arise from indifferent or poor selection. Once a CDO tranche guarantee is given, the reinsurer is at the mercy of the manager's actions, in addition to the risks of the underlying market. Typically, therefore, the manager's actions are circumscribed by protective covenants that (a) determine his freedom of action in day-to-day running of the portfolio and (b) force him to behave in particular ways under specific future (usually adverse) circumstances.
Traditional treaty reinsurance is conducted on an annual basis and therefore affords an annual opt out and review. CDO financial guarantees are multi-year, often for as much as 12 years. The scope and variety of specific future circumstances that need to be covered by a guideline must therefore be comprehensive and robust. The guidelines so designed, often known as "protective covenants," are designed to protect investors and guarantors alike.
A list of typical protective covenants is detailed in Table 1 . In order listed, they are: (1) Quality Tests, (2) Diversity Tests, (3) Par Value Tests, (4) Interest Coverage Tests.
1. Quality Tests. Purchases of collateral and sales thereof must only be entered into if they "improve" asset quality or do not reduce it below some minimum acceptable threshold. "Quality" is defined as the weighted average rating (WARF) or usually its numerical equivalent of the portfolio.
Diversity Tests.
The manager is compelled to maintain a diverse portfolio of bonds or loans spreading assets over several industrial sectors. Typically, the diversity is measured and quantified by the Moody's "Diversity Score" or its competitor equivalents.
Par Value Tests.
The manager is required to maintain the par value of the total portfolio at some minimum multiple of the par value of a particular tranche. This typically starts with the senior debt and cumulatively cascades down through the structure. Failure to maintain such ratio, perhaps due to defaults, requires forced action on the part of the manager. Within a specified period of time, the manager must sell collateral and pay down the senior debt until the ratio of the remaining portfolio comes into conformance with requirements. (See the December 7, 2000 article of The Wall Street Journal for a market-based description of contemporary activity in this area.) The effect of this requirement and its remedy is to reset the protections of senior debt holders to the same level at the start of each period. Similar provisions have been enshrined in Cat bonds that reset attachment points -calculable from some agreed upon model each exposure period. In CDOs the resets only take place after the thresholds have been penetrated and not on any preset timetable.
Interest Coverage Tests.
It is required that the collateral generate sufficient interest to be able to pay a multiple of the interest obligations of the senior debt. Like the Par Value Test, this is usually applied cumulatively down through the capital structure. Also, as in the par value test, the remedy is some sale of collateral and pay down of senior obligations, or the diversion of interest from more junior tranches until the required ratios are restored.
The interest coverage test is most reminiscent of a bank loan covenant where the structure has been financed by pure debt. When pay downs are required, the effect of both par value and interest rate coverage tests is to "deleverage" the CDO. In other words, the size of the overall CDO shrinks.
Since the benefits to the junior debt or CDO manager depend on the size of the deal as much as the relative prices of the tranches, deleveraging may provide disincentives to continue managing the structure. Typically, the junior debt holder has the option to pay-down the structure. Usually, this option cannot be exercised for the first three years. If it is, the senior debt holders will need to be "made whole." However, these restrictions can be viewed as second order covenants, and a detailed review is beyond the scope of this paper.
The point to make about covenants, as with CDOs, is that they are exactly analogous to reinsurance underwriting guidelines.
Very few treaty reinsurers underwrite for multiple periods of 12 years. However, if they did, they would impose restrictions on the primary to confine his underwriting to specific types of policy and to regional distributions, etc. They would also want the primary to cease writing against committed capital if poor results occur -the exact analogue of deleverage to an asset manager.
FINANCIAL GUARANTEE
Our discussion so far has covered the case of fully funded CDOs and has likened the relative coupons each tranche receives to relative reinsurance premiums.
One benefit of this is to allow evaluation of the premium as an actual insurance guarantee.
Although not yet done by investment bankers as part of their investor information, we expect in the future to explicitly see reference to expected losses, probability of first dollar loss, probability of last dollar loss, etc. as they now provide with insurance-linked notes (the aforementioned cat bonds). At present, most investment banks only provide such information implicitly through a rating.
Once the risk of the default guarantee is made explicit, we believe more and more reinsurers will see financial guarantee of default risk as a legitimate alternative underwriting exercise. The decoupling of the default risk, properly priced, will allow mezzanine buyers the chance to independently use their extra premium to buy their own protection from a guarantor. Such transparency can only be of benefit to all concerned.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The object of this paper is to trace out the parallels between reinsurance methods and the selfcontained pricing of CDOs. To do so, we have looked at how the default risk premium of a portfolio of bonds is parsed according to the claims paying priority. We have also indicated that the sorts of restrictions that are placed by covenants on a manager of a CDO are extremely similar in spirit to those that a treaty reinsurer would apply to a primary insurer. In essence, a CDO tranche is a multiyear excess of loss reinsurance with a single aggregate occurrence limit.
The conventional underlying risk is corporate default. Now, there are also ways in which CDOs differ significantly from traditional reinsurance -the most notable of which is that guarantee of financial default is payable on demand, not after adjudication of a claim. To underscore the point, Standard & Poor's has initiated an "Insurer Financial Strength Rating" (FSR) * to augment its more normal credit-worthiness rating.
Entities receiving a FSR are presumed by the rating agencies to know the financial guarantee demands of the capital markets, and can be expected to respond accordingly. Multiline reinsurers now have the prospect of being rated for general credit worthiness (Moody's, Standard & Poor's), insurance claims paying ability (A.M. Best), and guarantee responsiveness (S&P FSR). Are multiple ratings another manifestation of "convergence"?
* In an earlier version of this paper, S&P's Financial Strength Rating was mistakenly attributed to Moody's.
Be that as it may, the knowledge gained by reinsurers about CDO structures can only enhance the reinsurers product creativity. Conversely, the action of the multiline reinsurers in guaranteeing the capital market products, such as CDOs, can only lend precision to their proper pricing.
Future papers will examine CDO pricing versus corporate bonds together with the spate of new cat bonds. We will also examine CDO covenants and ask, "Are they friend or foe?" Should CDO investors learn about "moral hazard" and "adverse selection" -as any reinsurance underwriter would -and will this affect CDO receptivity?
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